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STATE V. GRIER AND THE ERRONEOUS ADOPTION OF
THE “PUNISHMENT-BASED” STANDARD OF REVIEW
FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
BASED ON ALL-OR-NOTHING STRATEGIES
Jacque St. Romain
Abstract: In June 2009, the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division II, reversed
Kristina Grier’s second-degree murder conviction in State v. Grier.1 The court concluded that
Grier had received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to request
jury instructions for any lesser-included offenses, choosing instead to pursue an all-ornothing defense strategy. That same month, Division I issued a contrary opinion, finding the
pursuit of an all-or-nothing strategy reasonable. The Washington State Supreme Court has
granted certiorari and will soon hear oral arguments in Grier. This Comment reviews federal
and state courts’ approaches to questions of ineffective assistance of counsel involving all-ornothing strategies and argues that, when the Washington State Supreme Court resolves State
v. Grier, it should review attorneys’ strategic decisions under a highly deferential standard.
This standard would align with state precedent and federal practice and would preserve trial
attorneys’ discretion, provide defendants with a true adversarial process, and repair the split
State v. Grier created.

INTRODUCTION
The lesser-included-offense doctrine has existed since the 1600s,
when common law authorized juries to convict a defendant charged with
murder of the “lesser offense” of manslaughter if the evidence supported
the lesser charge.2 The lesser-included-offense doctrine “provides that a
criminal defendant may be convicted at trial of any crime supported by
the evidence which is less than, but included within, the offense charged
by the prosecution.”3 The doctrine, originally created to aid the
prosecution where it could not prove all elements of the crime charged,
is now recognized as being potentially beneficial to both parties.4

1. 150 Wash. App. 619, 208 P.3d 1221 (2009).
2. Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Rise and Fall of Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 351,
376 (2005).
3. James A. Shellenberger & James A. Strazzella, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine and the
Constitution: The Development of Due Process and Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79 MARQ. L. REV.
1, 6 (1995).
4. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633–34 (1980) (“This rule originally developed as an aid to
the prosecution in cases in which the proof failed to establish some element of the crime charged.
But it has long been recognized that it can also be beneficial to the defendant because it affords the
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A defendant has the right to request that the jury receive lesserincluded-offense instructions where evidence suggests the defendant
might have committed a less serious offense than the crime charged.5
For example, a defendant charged with second-degree murder has the
right to request a jury instruction for any lesser-included offenses of
which the evidence suggests the defendant may instead be guilty, such as
first- and second-degree manslaughter.6 Providing lesser-includedoffense instructions provides the jury with more options because
“[w]hen a charged offense involves one or more lesser included
offenses . . . a jury not only has the options of acquittal or conviction of
the charged offense, but also the options of acquittal or conviction of
each lesser included offense.”7 This approach can benefit the defendant
who would face a lower penalty if found guilty of a lesser offense.8
However, while defendants have the right to such instructions,
some—for instance, those charged with commission of a noncapital
crime9—might not want them. In a noncapital murder trial, for example,
“[o]ne legitimate trial strategy for the defendant . . . is an ‘all-or-nothing’
one in which the defendant seeks acquittal while realizing that the jury
might instead convict of murder.”10 Under this strategy, the defendant
chooses to limit the jury’s options and thereby risk the greater conviction
in the hope that the jury will acquit. Defendants who take this gamble
usually do so because they fear that, if presented with intermediate
options, the jury will reach a compromise verdict, finding the defendant
guilty of the lesser offense.11
If the gamble fails, a defendant may challenge an attorney’s use of an
all-or-nothing strategy through a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.12 Defendants often raise this issue on appeal, hoping the courts
jury a less drastic alternative than the choice between conviction of the offense charged and
acquittal.” (internal citations omitted)).
5. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982).
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c) (“The defendant may be found guilty of . . . an offense necessarily
included in the offense charged.”).
7. David F. Abele, Jury Deliberations and the Lesser Included Offense Rule: Getting the Courts
Back in Step, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 376 (1990).
8. Amanda Peters, Thirty-One Years in the Making: Why the Texas Court of Appeals’ New
Single-Method Approach to Lesser-Included Offense Analysis Is a Step in the Right Direction, 60
BAYLOR L. REV. 231, 235 (2008).
9. Beck, 447 U.S. at 644–45 (holding that lesser-included offenses must be provided in capital
cases).
10. Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. 2008).
11. Id.
12. Michael T. Judge, Comment, Control and Direction of the Defense: The All-Or-Nothing
Defense Tactic in the Context of Ineffective Representation, 10 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 209, 209
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will overturn their convictions and allow them new trials. Courts
examining such claims look to the particular facts of each case to
determine the tactical decision’s reasonability.13 Like any trial strategy,
the all-or-nothing approach “has both potential risks and potential
rewards,” and parties deciding on tactics “must weigh these risks and
rewards.”14
In response to the risky nature of the all-or-nothing strategy, courts
employ different tests when analyzing use of the doctrine in capital and
noncapital cases. While the United States Supreme Court has never
addressed the issue directly, in one case the Court struck down a state
law that forbade the inclusion of jury instructions presenting lesserincluded offenses in a death-penalty case.15 Federal courts have
subsequently interpreted that case as requiring lesser-included-offense
jury instructions in all capital cases, thus effectively banning all-ornothing strategies in those trials.16 In noncapital cases, however, most
federal courts continue to recognize all-or-nothing strategies as
legitimate trial tactics that deserve high deference upon review.17
States have taken different approaches to the all-or-nothing strategy.
Presumably fearing the tactic might increase the chance of an erroneous
conviction, state legislators in California and Tennessee have, in the
past, gone so far as to mandate the inclusion of lesser-included-offense
instructions for noncapital cases, effectively banning the use of all-ornothing strategies altogether.18 In seven states where legislatures have
not statutorily banned all-or-nothing strategies, courts “have

(1987).
13. State v. Hassan, 151 Wash. App. 209, 219, 211 P.3d 441, 446 (2009) (“The determination of
whether an all or nothing strategy is objectively unreasonable is a highly fact specific inquiry.”).
14. Patrick D. Pflaum, Justice Is Not All or Nothing: Preserving the Integrity of Criminal Trials
Through the Statutory Abolition of the All-or-Nothing Doctrine, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 289, 300
(2002).
15. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637–38 (1980) (holding that a law forbidding the inclusion
of any lesser-included-offense instructions in a capital case violates the Eighth Amendment).
16. See Catherine L. Carpenter, The All-or-Nothing Doctrine in Criminal Cases: Independent
Trial Strategy or Gamesmanship Gone Awry?, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 257, 274–77 (1999).
17. See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1159 (1989) (“The jury, or the judge . . . may find the defendant
guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is
charged . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-18-110(a) (1997) (“It is the duty of all judges charging
juries . . . wherein two (2) or more grades . . . of offenses may be included in the indictment, to
charge the jury as to all of the law of each offense included in the indictment, without any request
on the party of the defendant to do so.”) (amended in 2001 to allow for such strategies, stating that
the failure of a judge to provide lesser-included-offense instructions where not requested may not be
presented as a ground for relief); see also Pflaum, supra note 14, at 316.
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promulgated common-law rules to accomplish the same end.”19 The
remaining states have continued to allow the all-or-nothing strategy in
noncapital cases, leaving the decision of whether to pursue such a
strategy up to the parties.20
For more than 100 years, Washington State courts have given great
deference to defense counsel in questions of effective assistance of
counsel,21 and, in line with that deferential standard, neither the courts
nor the legislature have banned the use of all-or-nothing strategies in
noncapital trials. However, in three decisions over the last five years,
Washington courts have strayed from that approach.22 Most recently, in
State v. Grier, Division II of the Court of Appeals overturned a
noncapital murder conviction because an attorney unsuccessfully
utilized an all-or-nothing strategy.23 In reversing the conviction,
Division II relied on a “punishment-based” standard24 that Division I had
applied in two prior cases.25
Part I of this Comment discusses the federal courts’ highly deferential
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on all-ornothing strategies in noncapital cases. Part II details the similarly
deferential approach Washington courts have traditionally used when
analyzing such claims. Part III examines the fractured approach of
Division I of the Court of Appeals, culminating in its rejection of its own
“punishment-based” standard in State v. Hassan.26 Part IV examines
Division II’s subsequent adoption of the “punishment-based” standard in
State v. Grier and the split that it created. Finally, Part V argues that the
Washington State Supreme Court should apply a highly deferential
standard when it resolves State v. Grier and thus uphold the right of
19. The seven states with such a common law rule are Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. See Pflaum, supra note 14, at 316.
20. See id. at 317.
21. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. In 1984, the United States Supreme Court
announced a highly deferential test for reviewing ineffective counsel claims, and Washington has
adopted that test as its own. State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398, 418, 717 P.2d 722, 733–34, cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 922 (1986) (adopting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
22. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 125 Wash. App. 243, 104 P.3d 670 (2004); State v. Pittman, 134
Wash. App. 376, 166 P.3d 720 (2006); State v. Grier, 150 Wash. App. 619, 208 P.3d 1221 (2009).
23. 150 Wash. App. at 644, 208 P.3d at 1234 (2009).
24. “Punishment-based” standard is the term this Comment uses to describe the method
Division I and Division II have used to determine the reasonability of trial strategies. The standard
compares the high-end of the standard sentencing range for the crime charged with that of the
lesser-included offense that could have been proposed and determines the reasonability of the
strategy based on how great the difference is between the sentencing ranges.
25. The two cases were Ward and Pittman. See discussion infra Part III.
26. 151 Wash. App. 209, 211 P.3d 441 (2009).
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attorneys and clients to employ all-or-nothing tactics in noncapital trials.
Applying a highly deferential standard aligns with United States and
Washington State Supreme Court precedent, preserves trial attorneys’
discretion, provides defendants with a true adversarial process, and
repairs the split State v. Grier created, once again providing clear
guidance to lower courts.
I.

FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE SUGGESTS INEFFECTIVENESS
CLAIMS FOR ALL-OR-NOTHING TACTICS IN
NONCAPITAL CASES SHOULD RECEIVE DEFERENCE

The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the
right to have assistance from an attorney.27 The United States Supreme
Court has interpreted this guarantee as requiring not only assistance of
counsel, but effective assistance of counsel.28 To that end, the Court
created a highly deferential test for determining when an attorney has
been ineffective. In Beck v. Alabama,29 the Court specifically addressed
all-or-nothing strategies only in the capital context, where it prohibited a
state from precluding lesser-included-offense instructions.30 Most federal
courts have chosen not to extend that limitation to noncapital cases.
Instead, they utilize a highly deferential standard when reviewing
ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding all-or-nothing trial
strategies.
A.

The United States Supreme Court Mandates a Highly Deferential
Standard of Review for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The right to an attorney is the most basic and pervasive right that the
Sixth Amendment provides.31 The United States Supreme Court has
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial. . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
28. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); see also Ronald L. Rahal, Note,
Wilson v. Mintzes: A Case of Ineffective Assistance or Denial of Counsel of Choice?, 17 U. TOL. L.
REV. 615, 622–30 (1986).
29. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
30. Id.
31. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (“Of all the rights that an accused
person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his
ability to assert any other rights he may have.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged
with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries,
but it is in ours.”).
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interpreted “effective assistance” as the right to have a true adversarial
process32 and has held that when such an adversarial proceeding occurs,
the right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is satisfied, even when
defense counsel makes demonstrable errors in judgment and tactics.33
In Strickland v. Washington,34 the United States Supreme Court laid
out a two-prong test for determining when a court must deem defense
counsel ineffective.35 Under this test, a defendant must first show that
the defense attorney’s performance was so deficient and included errors
so serious that the attorney was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.36 Second, the defendant must show
that this deficient performance prejudiced the case—that the errors
actually deprived the defendant of a fair trial, thus calling into question
the validity of the verdict.37 If the attorney’s error did not affect the
outcome, then the claim fails, regardless of how deficient the
representation may have been.38
In this way, the Strickland Court stressed the heavy burden placed on
a defendant to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.39 The Court
mandated that judicial scrutiny of a defense attorney’s performance be
“highly deferential” in order to “eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight.”40 A reviewing court must defer to counsel’s strategic
decision to present, or to forgo, a particular defense theory where the
decision falls within the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.41 Strickland mandates that a court reviewing an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s
actions “on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of

32. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 (“The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of
the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial
testing.”).
33. Id.
34. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
35. Id. at 687.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 694 (noting that under the second prong, the “defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different”).
38. Id. at 697.
39. Id. at 689.
40. Id.
41. Id.; United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1419–20 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1046 (1989); Campbell v. Knicheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1462 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
948 (1988).
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counsel’s conduct.”42 Courts may not view the attorney’s actions
through hindsight but instead must focus on what transpired in
preparation for and at the trial.43
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the
deferential nature of review that courts should apply to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.44 However, the Court has only specifically
addressed the necessity of lesser-included-offense instructions in the
context of capital crimes.
B.

Federal Courts Have Forbidden All-or-Nothing Tactics in Death
Penalty Cases, but Have Generally Declined to Extend that Bar to
Noncapital Cases

Though the United States Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed whether a defense attorney would be ineffective by choosing
to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy, the Court held in Beck v. Alabama
that the Alabama state legislature could not forbid a jury from hearing
lesser-included-offense instructions in a death penalty case.45
In Beck, the United States Supreme Court invalidated an Alabama
statute that prohibited the state’s courts from giving lesser-includedoffense instructions to a jury when a defendant was charged with
committing a capital offense.46 The Court noted that while the common
law lesser-included-offense rule was originally intended to aid the
prosecution, it might also benefit defendants,47 and thus it “has long been
‘beyond dispute that the defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser

42. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
43. Id.
44. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) (noting “hindsight is discounted by pegging
adequacy to counsel’s perspective at the time investigative decisions are made and by giving a
heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments” (internal quotations and citations omitted));
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (acknowledging that “judicial scrutiny of a counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential and that every effort must be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S.
776, 795 (1987) (“In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision . . . must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s
judgments.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691)); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 185 (1986)
(“As we recognized in Strickland: [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential.” (internal quotation omitted)).
45. 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980).
46. Id. at 638.
47. Id. at 633–34.
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included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find
him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.’”48
The Court explained that, “[w]here one of the elements of the offense
charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some
offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.”49
The Court found it particularly likely that the jury would find in favor of
conviction when the evidence indicated the defendant was
unquestionably guilty of a serious violent offense, even where some
doubt existed as to an element that would warrant conviction of the
capital offense.50 The Court reasoned that the risk of an unwarranted
conviction “cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant’s life is
at stake.”51 While the Court held only that a defendant in a capital case is
constitutionally entitled to lesser-included-offense instructions,52 federal
courts have interpreted Beck as requiring that such instructions be
provided, regardless of whether a defendant wants or requests them.53
The Supreme Court has subsequently refined its holding in Beck.54
48. Id. at 636 (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)). In making this
determination, the Supreme Court relied on a previous decision, Keeble v. United States. There, the
Native American defendant had been charged with assault with intent to commit great bodily injury
under the Major Crimes Act of 1885. The defendant requested the lesser-included-offense
instruction of simple assault, but the trial court refused, finding itself unauthorized to provide such
an instruction under the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that defendants have a right to
have lesser-included-offense instructions provided to the jury, noting,
It is no answer to petitioner’s demand for a jury instruction on a lesser offense to argue that a
defendant may be better off without such an instruction. True, if the prosecution had not
established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged, and if no lesser
offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal.
But a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction . . . precisely because he
should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury’s practice will diverge from that
theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant
is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve doubts in favor of conviction.
Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212–13.
49. Beck, 447 U.S. at 634 (quoting Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212–13).
50. Id. at 637.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Carpenter, supra note 16.
54. The U.S. Supreme Court has refined Beck in three ways. Initially, it clarified that Beck allows
for lesser-included-offense instructions only where they are legally warranted. Then, it clarified that
lesser-included-offense instructions are only necessary where they are warranted by the evidence.
Finally, in Schad v. Arizona, the Court held that a defendant’s rights are not violated where some
lesser-included-offense instructions are provided, even if those instructions fail to include all
available options. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 456–57 (1984) (holding that where the
statute of limitations has run out on lesser-included offenses, the defendant can either waive the
statute of limitations or be tried without the lesser-included offenses provided because they are not
legally warranted); Hooper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 610 (1982) (holding that only instructions that
are warranted by the evidence may be provided); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991).
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However, because of the way federal courts subsequently interpreted the
opinion, all-or-nothing strategies may no longer be employed in capital
offense cases.55
While the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address whether defendants
may utilize the all-or-nothing strategy in noncapital cases,56 seven
federal circuit courts of appeals considering the question outside the
context of ineffective assistance of counsel have held that the all-ornothing strategy is sometimes permissible.57 The four federal circuit
courts that have specifically addressed all-or-nothing strategies within an
ineffective assistance of counsel context—the Sixth,58 Seventh,59

55. See Pflaum, supra note 14, at 307.
56. Deanna Hall, Note, The “Third Option”: Extending the Lesser-Included Offense Doctrine to
the Noncapital Context, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1333, 1341 (2001).
57. See, e.g., Tata v. Carver, 917 F.2d 670, 672 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the exclusion of
lesser-included-offense instructions in noncapital cases does not qualify as a “fundamental
miscarriage of justice” and thus does not warrant reversal); Valles v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 126, 127
(5th Cir. 1988) (holding that “[i]n a noncapital murder case, the failure to give an instruction on a
lesser-included offense does not raise a federal constitutional issue”); Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d
792, 796 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Beck, 447 U.S. at 638) (finding it unnecessary to extend Beck to
noncapital offenses because the analysis in Beck seemed to be based on Eighth Amendment
grounds); Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267, 1271 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding it unnecessary to extend
Beck because the United States Supreme Court itself emphasized the capital nature of the greater
offense in Beck and expressly reserved the applicability of the holding to noncapital offenses);
Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d 597, 603 (10th Cir. 1987) (choosing not to extend Beck to noncapital
offense cases); Perry v. Smith, 810 F.2d 1078, 1080 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that in a noncapital
case the Constitution’s Due Process Clause does not require a state court to instruct the jury on
lesser-included offenses). But see Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023 (3rd Cir. 1988) (holding that
a defendant in a noncapital case is entitled to all available lesser-included offense instructions).
58. See Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 808 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t was a permissible exercise of
trial strategy not to request [lesser-included-offense instructions] given that [the defendant’s]
primary line of defense was that [the defendant] was not the shooter.”); Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598,
607 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding counsel’s failure to request an involuntary manslaughter instruction did
not constitute deficient performance under the Strickland test where counsel made a strategic
decision to advance other defense theories); Lewis v. Russell, 42 F. App’x 809, 810–11 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of
voluntary manslaughter in a murder trial constituted a reasonable strategic decision where the
strategy was consistent with defendant’s effort to seek full acquittal on the basis of self-defense);
Edwards v. Mack, 4 F. App’x 215, 217–18 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding counsel’s omission of jury
instructions on lesser-included offenses constituted effective assistance, even if the all-or-nothing
strategy was pursued without the defendant’s permission, because it constituted a proper exercise of
counsel’s judgment).
59. See Adams v. Bertrand, 453 F.3d 428, 430, 435–36 (7th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the trial
strategy “could have led to a complete acquittal had the jury agreed that proof of force was lacking”
and holding that because of the possibility of an acquittal, “[c]ounsel’s decision here dwells in the
region of tactics and strategy”); United States v. Boyles, No. 92-3886, slip op. at 32–33 (7th Cir.
June 8, 1995); Barnett v. Godinez, 61 F.3d 905, 1995 WL 399030, at *4 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“Presenting the jury with an all-or-nothing choice is generally a reasonable trial strategy because,
although it involves a risk, it increases the chances of an acquittal.”); Sarwacinski v. McBride, 51
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Eighth,60 and Ninth Circuits61—have each applied Strickland’s highly
deferential standard, granting great deference to trial attorneys in
determining which trial strategies to use. The United States Army Board
of Review has similarly found all-or-nothing strategies reasonable in
court-martial proceedings.62 In sum, federal courts have consistently
declined to extend Beck’s reasoning, instead employing a highly
deferential standard in reviewing all-or-nothing strategies in noncapital
cases.
II.

WASHINGTON COURTS APPLY STRICKLAND AND GRANT
GREAT DEFERENCE TO TRIAL LAWYERS’ STRATEGIC
CHOICES

Like the United States Constitution, the Washington State
Constitution also guarantees the right to assistance of counsel.63 The

F.3d 276, 1995 WL 123120, at *3 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the attorney’s “decision not to
submit a voluntary manslaughter charge, which he made with the express approval of his client,
does not constitute ineffective assistance under the performance prong of Strickland”); United
States v. Windsor, 981 F.2d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 1991); Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 365 (7th Cir.
1989) (noting that there is a “general proposition that it is reasonable to forego a lesser included
offense instruction where a defendant has presented an alibi defense”).
60. Riley v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 421, 422–23 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that “a petitioner shoulders a
heavy burden in proving ineffective assistance” and holding that “hindsight, though a superior view,
does not form the basis for finding a constitutional deprivation in strategic or tactical decisions”);
Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Trial of law suits is peculiarly susceptible to
hindsight appraisal of another lawyer’s endeavors. When trial counsel exercise their judgment in
making strategic decisions, third party post-trial construction of strategic alternatives cannot be the
sole basis for finding constitutional deficiency.”).
61. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1984) (“With the benefit of hindsight we
know that this [all-or-nothing] strategy was incorrect; however, it did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel” because “reasoned tactical decisions are not faulted, even if in retrospect
better tactics were available.”).
62. United States v. Craighead, 22 C.M.R. 523, 524–25, 1956 WL 4822 (1956) (“The entire
theory of the defense at the trial was in direct contradiction of the commission of any offense of
lesser included offenses. The theory of the defense was designed to secure an acquittal and was
based on an ‘all or nothing’ strategy. . . . Such trial tactics specifically rejected any possible lesser
included offenses” and thereby make the decision not to propose such instructions manifestly
reasonable.).
63. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person, or by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to meet the witnesses against him
face to face, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have
been committed and the right to appeal in all cases . . . . In no instance shall any accused person
before final judgment be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.”); see State v. Sardinia, 42 Wash. App. 533, 538, 713 P.2d 122 (1986) (“The
Washington State and United States Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to
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Washington State Supreme Court has held that the State’s guaranteed
right to assistance of counsel is equivalent to the protection guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment64 and, accordingly, has followed federal
precedent.65 As such, the Washington State Supreme Court has adopted
the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of effective assistance of
counsel66 and has consistently applied the Strickland test when
reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.67 This Part reviews
Washington’s highly deferential approach before and after Strickland
and demonstrates that state courts have given similarly high deference to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on all-or-nothing trial
strategies.
A.

Before and After Strickland, Washington Courts Employed a
Highly Deferential Standard of Review for Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims

The Washington State Supreme Court explicitly adopted the
Strickland test for determining ineffectiveness of counsel in 1986.68 But
even before then, Washington courts employed a highly deferential
standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims.69 For
effective assistance of counsel.”).
64. See In re Davis, 152 Wash. 2d 647, 672, 101 P.3d 1, 16 (2004) (“Under the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution, a
defendant is guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings.”).
65. See State v. Heddrick, 166 Wash. 2d 898, 910, 215 P.3d 201, 207 (2009) (citing United States
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658–59, 659 n.25 (1984), for holding that a “complete denial of counsel at
a critical stage of the proceedings is presumptively prejudicial and calls for automatic reversal”);
State v. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d 631, 663, 845 P.2d 289, 307 (1993) (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S.
776, 788–89 (1987), which applied the Strickland standard to death penalty proceedings).
66. The Supreme Court of Washington specifically adopted the Strickland test in State v. Jeffries.
105 Wash. 2d 398, 418, 717 P.2d 722, 733–34, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 (1986).
67. See In re Davis, 152 Wash. 2d at 672, 101 P.3d at 1; In re Brett, 142 Wash. 2d 868, 873, 16
P.3d 601, 603–04 (2001) (citing Strickland’s two-part test); State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61,
77, 917 P.2d 563, 571 (1996) (citing and applying Strickland’s two-part test); State v. McFarland,
127 Wash. 2d 322, 334–35, 899 P.2d 1251, 1256–57 (1995) (citing and applying Strickland’s twopart test).
68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
69. See State v. Adams, 91 Wash. 2d 86, 91, 586 P.2d 1168, 1171 (1978) (“Only when defense
counsel’s conduct cannot be explained by any tactical or strategic justification which at least some
reasonably competent, fairly experienced criminal defense lawyers might agree with or find
reasonably debatable, should counsel’s performance be considered inadequate.”); Fleetwood v.
Rhay, 7 Wash. App. 225, 228, 498 P.2d 891, 893 (1972) (“Hindsight is a recognized educator; it
should not be a substitute for appreciating the difficult decisions required of trial and appellate
counsel . . . . While different counsel might have made different decisions, we do not believe the
trial was reduced to a farce so as to impugn the dictates of due process.”); State v. Gibson, 79 Wash.
2d 856, 862, 490 P.2d 874, 877 (1971) (“It is only when the incompetence or neglect of a
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example, in 1978—five years before the United States Supreme Court
decided Strickland—the Washington State Supreme Court
acknowledged that, “[a]s a general rule, the relative wisdom or lack
thereof of counsel’s decisions should not be open for review after
conviction.”70
In the years following Strickland, Washington courts have repeatedly
affirmed their highly deferential approach for reviewing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims and have incorporated the Strickland twopart test.71 Additionally, to overturn a conviction, a state court must find
that there were no legitimate tactical reasons for the strategy employed,72
placing an even heavier burden on defendants to prove their claim. The
Washington State Supreme Court has defended this burden as a
necessary result of high deference: “We will not find ineffective
assistance of counsel if the actions [a defendant] complains about go to
the theory of the case or trial tactics.”73 Moreover, Washington courts
employ a strong presumption of effective assistance of counsel,74 which
defendants may only overcome with a clear showing of incompetence.75
Specifically, a defendant “must demonstrate that his counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that
he was prejudiced by his counsel’s errors such that ‘but for counsel’s
errors that outcome of the proceedings would have been different.’”76 In
other words, the defense counsel’s performance must have been so
lawyer . . . results in the violation of a constitutional right by reducing the trial to a farce that a new
trial will be granted.” (quoting State v. Mode, 57 Wash. 2d 829, 833, 360 P.2d 159, 161 (1961)).
70. Adams, 91 Wash. 2d at 91, 586 P.2d at 1171.
71. See State v. Donaldson, 141 Wash. App. 1002, 2007 WL 2909650, at *7 (2007) (“To show
deficient performance, [a defendant] has the heavy burden of showing that his attorneys made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); State v. Hayes, 81 Wash. App. 425, 442,
914 P.2d 788, 798, review denied, 130 Wash. 2d 1013, 928 P.2d 413 (1996); State v. White, 84
Wash. App. 1015, 1996 WL 219648, at *7 (1996) (holding “defendant has the ‘heavy burden’ of
showing that counsel’s performance was deficient in light of all surrounding circumstances”); State
v. Sherwood, 71 Wash. App. 481, 483, 860 P.2d 407, 409 (1993) (“The defendant has the heavy
burden of showing, after a review of the entire record, that counsel’s performance fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness after considering all surrounding circumstances.” (internal
citations omitted)).
72. State v. Rainey, 107 Wash. App. 129, 135–36, 28 P.3d 10, 14 (2001) (“The defendant bears
the burden of showing there were no ‘legitimate strategic or tactical reasons’ behind defense
counsel’s decision.”).
73. State v. Varga, 151 Wash. 2d 179, 199, 86 P.3d 139, 149 (2004).
74. State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251, 1257 (1995).
75. Varga, 151 Wash. 2d at 199, 86 P.3d at 149.
76. Id. at 198, 86 P.3d at 149 (citing State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 199, 892 P.2d 29, 62
(1995)).

082610 StRomain Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2010]

8/30/2010 8:16 AM

GRIER’S PUNISHMENT-BASED STANDARD

559

deficient that it was manifestly unreasonable.
B.

Washington Courts Have Traditionally Employed a Highly
Deferential Standard When Reviewing Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims Based on All-or-Nothing Strategies

Few courts in Washington have considered the specific question of
whether pursuing an all-or-nothing strategy constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel.77 However, the Washington State Supreme Court
and the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division II, have each
found that such trial tactics should receive great deference on appeal.78
Additionally, the Court of Appeals, Division I, held that presiding judges
must provide lesser-included-offense instructions only if a defendant
requests them.79 Division II has interpreted this rule as meaning
attorneys are not ineffective when they fail to propose lesser-included
instructions.80
In line with that interpretation, in 1979, Division II affirmed a
defendant’s conviction where the defendant was charged with seconddegree assault after a brawl outside of a bar.81 Rather than asking the
court to provide an instruction on a lesser-included offense, the
defendant’s attorney chose to “attempt to persuade the jurors that the
affray was not as violent as some witnesses suggested and that the
injuries sustained did not produce pain and suffering of a sufficient
magnitude to qualify as grievous bodily harm.”82 The court held that the
attorney was not ineffective because “[i]t was an all-or-nothing tactic
that well could have resulted in an outright acquittal.”83

77. Only two Washington cases raised the issue before 2004: State v. Hoffman, 116 Wash. 2d 51,
804 P.2d 577 (1991) (holding that a choice to pursue an all-or-nothing tactic could well result in an
outright acquittal); State v. King, 24 Wash. App. 495, 601 P.2d 982 (1979) (holding that an attorney
did not provide ineffective representation for choosing to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy). For a
detailed description of the lesser-included-offense doctrine in Washington State, see Kyron
Huigens, The Doctrine of Lesser Included Offenses, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 185 (1992).
78. See supra note 77.
79. See State v. Walker, 13 Wash. App. 545, 550, 536 P.2d 657, 662 (1975) (“The defense did not
propose an instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter, and, in fact, rejected the
possibility when it was raised. . . . When the evidence would support a finding of guilty on a lesser
included offense and an instruction on the lesser included offense is proposed, then the instruction
must be given, but not otherwise.”).
80. King, 24 Wash. App. at 501, 601 P.2d at 986 (citing Walker, 13 Wash. App. at 550, 536 P.2d
at 662).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Subsequently, in State v. Hoffman,84 the Washington State Supreme
Court utilized a highly deferential standard of review when it considered
the reasonableness of an all-or-nothing strategy that had failed.85 In
Hoffman, the Court concluded that, “[h]ad the jury decided (as the
defendants strenuously argued) that the evidence did not prove the
charges of murder in the first degree and assault in the second degree
beyond a reasonable doubt, then under the instructions given, the
defendants would have been acquitted.”86 Ultimately, the Court
recognized that the decision to withhold the lesser-included-offense
instruction was a tactic employed to get the jury to acquit the
defendant.87 The failure of that tactic did not make its use unreasonable:
“The defendants cannot have it both ways; having decided to follow one
course at the trial, they cannot on appeal now change their course and
complain that their gamble did not pay off. Defendants’ decision to not
have included offense instructions given was clearly a calculated defense
trial tactic.”88 In an effort to prevent defendants from retrying their cases
when initial strategies fail,89 Washington courts have continued to utilize
deferential review when considering decisions regarding trial strategy,
including all-or-nothing tactics.90
III. WASHINGTON’S COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION I,
ADOPTED A “PUNISHMENT-BASED” STANDARD OF
REVIEW IN 2004, BUT ABANDONED IT IN 2009
Prior to 2009, the Court of Appeals, Division I, had considered all-ornothing strategies only twice.91 In both cases, the court attempted to
establish a method for determining the reasonableness of trial tactics.92
The court’s approach required close examination of each case’s facts to
determine whether the choice to withhold lesser-included-offense
instructions was manifestly unreasonable. To determine reasonableness,
the court considered the discrepancy between the punishment for the
crime charged and the punishment for the lesser-included offense. The
84. 116 Wash. 2d 51, 804 P.2d 577 (1991).
85. Id. at 111–12, 804 P.2d at 608–09.
86. Id. at 112, 804 P.2d at 609.
87. Id. at 111–13, 804 P.2d at 609.
88. Id. at 112, 804 P.2d at 609.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
91. See State v. Ward and State v. Pittman, discussed infra Part III.A and III.B.
92. See State v. Ward and State v. Pittman, discussed infra Part III.A and III.B.
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court announced this “punishment-based” standard in State v. Ward93
and subsequently utilized it in State v. Pittman.94 However, two years
later, in State v. Hassan,95 the court abandoned this approach and
reverted to a more deferential standard of review.
A.

Ward Set Forth a “Punishment-Based” Analysis of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims Regarding All-or-Nothing Strategies
and Pittman Further Clarified that Standard

In 2004, Division I decided State v. Ward, in which the defendant
faced eighty-nine months in prison for assault convictions.96 The lesserincluded offense of unlawful display of a weapon would have warranted
a maximum sentence of one year in prison,97 but defense counsel chose
not to propose it, hoping for an acquittal instead.98 The Court of Appeals
focused on the difference in possible punishments between the crime
charged and the lesser-included offense and found a difference of
seventy-seven months.99 The court, highlighting the fact that the choice
to pursue a claim of self-defense was risky because it depended entirely
on the credibility of the defendant, found the difference in punishments
significant.100 Thus, it concluded that the decision to pursue an all-ornothing strategy was objectively unreasonable.101
In determining whether the defendant had been provided with
effective assistance of counsel, the court relied on a United States
Supreme Court case cited in Beck. The case, Keeble v. United States,102
noted that it is not acceptable for the court to refuse a request for a
lesser-included-offense instruction simply because a defendant might be
better off without it.103 Citing Keeble’s reasoning, Division I created a
new standard that looked entirely to the discrepancy in possible
punishments to determine reasonability.104 Utilizing this “punishment-

93. 125 Wash. App. 243, 249, 104 P.3d 670, 673 (2004).
94. 134 Wash. App. 376, 388–89, 166 P.3d 720, 725 (2006).
95. 151 Wash. App. 209, 211 P.3d 441 (2009).
96. Ward, 125 Wash. App. at 249, 104 P.3d at 673.
97. Id..
98. Id.
99. Id. at 247, 104 P.3d at 671.
100. Id. at 250, 104 P.3d at 673.
101. Id.
102. 412 U.S. 205 (1973).
103. Ward, 125 Wash. App. at 250–51, 104 P.3d at 673 (citing Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212–13).
104. Id. at 249, 104 P.3d at 672–73.
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based” standard, the court reversed the conviction, finding that no
reasonable person would choose to risk an additional punishment of
seventy-seven months for the chance of acquittal when a lesser-included
offense might have resulted in a mere twelve-month sentence.105
Two years later, Division I considered a similar issue in State v.
Pittman, in which the defendant faced a standard-range sentence of nine
to ten-and-a-half months for attempted residential burglary.106 The
lesser-included offense of criminal trespass, for which the defense
attorney chose not to propose instructions, carried a maximum penalty of
only ninety days.107 The court, employing Ward’s standard, found that
the difference was significant and concluded that the choice to pursue
the all-or-nothing tactic was manifestly unreasonable.108 In making its
determination, the court again relied on Keeble as well as its own
reasoning from Ward.109
B.

Division I Retreated from the “Punishment-Based” Standard in
State v. Hassan

Two years after creating its “punishment-based” approach, Division I
questioned the standard’s legitimacy when it reverted to the traditional
highly deferential standard in deciding State v. Hassan.110
On August 14, 2007, police arrested Rashid Ali Hassan after watching
him perform three separate drug transactions.111 The arresting officer
claimed that, during each transaction, he watched an individual approach
Hassan and hand him money.112 Hassan deposited the money into a
backpack from which he retrieved a small plastic bag.113 The State
charged Hassan with one count of possession of marijuana with intent to
deliver.114
At trial, Hassan admitted that he had purchased two bags of marijuana
that day but denied ownership of the backpack, claiming that its owner

105. Id. at 250, 104 P.3d at 673.
106. 134 Wash. App. 376, 389, 166 P.3d 720, 725 (2006).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 387–90, 166 P.3d at 725–26.
109. Id. at 387–88, 166 P.3d at 725 (citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1973),
and Ward, 125 Wash. App. at 250, 104 P.3d at 673).
110. 151 Wash. App. 209, 211 P.3d 441 (2009).
111. Id. at 212, 211 P.3d at 442–43.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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had gone to the restroom when the officer arrived.115 Two defense
witnesses corroborated Hassan’s claims.116 Hassan’s counsel did not
propose jury instructions on the lesser-included offense of possession of
marijuana.117 In closing, the defense argued that the State had not met its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Hassan possessed the
marijuana with the intent to deliver118 and asserted that Hassan’s
testimony was more credible than the State’s evidence because only
Hassan’s version of the events had been corroborated.119
The jury found Hassan guilty and the court sentenced him to nine
months in the King County Work Education Release Program.120 Hassan
appealed his conviction, arguing that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to propose jury
instructions regarding possession, a lesser-included offense of the crime
charged.121 The Court of Appeals, Division I, found the decision to
withhold a lesser-included-offense instruction a legitimate trial strategy
and affirmed the conviction and sentencing.122 The court held that
because the only chance the defendant had for acquittal was to withhold
the lesser-included-offense instruction, “the decision to pursue an all or
nothing strategy was not objectively unreasonable.”123 The court
reasoned that because Hassan admitted he committed the lesser offense
and the only dispute was whether the backpack belonged to him, the
defense attorney’s attempt at an acquittal was a legitimate tactic.124
Division I spent little time discussing the difference between
sentences available for the crime charged and for the lesser-included
offense, a difference of three to fifteen months.125 Instead, the court used
a more deferential standard of review based on Strickland and affirmed
Hassan’s conviction.126 Specifically, the court quoted Strickland in

115. Id. at 213, 211 P.3d at 443.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 214, 211 P.3d at 444.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 214–15, 211 P.3d at 444.
120. Id. at 216, 211 P.3d at 445.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 221, 211 P.3d at 447.
124. Id. at 220–21, 211 P.3d at 447.
125. Id. at 219–20, 211 P.3d at 447 (“[T]he sentence for possession of marijuana with intent to
deliver is 6+ to 18 months, while the sentence for the lesser included misdemeanor of possession of
less than 40 grams of marijuana is 3 months.”).
126. Id. at 217, 221, 211 P.3d at 445, 447.
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support of the strong presumption of defense counsel’s effectiveness:
“[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,
the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial
strategy.’”127 Hassan, the court concluded, had not overcome this strong
presumption of effectiveness.128
While the Hassan court declined to address whether Ward and
Pittman were correctly decided, it did clarify that the reasoning in those
cases did not “properly take into consideration the strong presumption of
effective assistance in determining whether the decision to seek acquittal
was a legitimate trial strategy.”129 Further, Division I noted that those
cases relied on out-of-context dicta from Keeble, a case the Hassan court
found irrelevant because it “did not address ineffective assistance of
counsel or the strategic decision to pursue an all or nothing strategy in
consultation with the client.”130 While it is still unclear how Division I
will approach future ineffective assistance of counsel claims stemming
from all-or-nothing strategies, Hassan indicates that it has retreated from
the so-called “punishment-based” standard created in Ward.
IV. IN STATE V. GRIER, DIVISION II ADOPTED DIVISION I’S
“PUNISHMENT-BASED” STANDARD
In June 2009, just as Division I began to distance itself from its earlier
decisions in Ward and Pittman, Division II embraced those cases as
guiding precedent and, in State v. Grier,131 adopted the “punishmentbased” standard.132 Grier involved the shooting death of Gregory Scott
Owen while he attended a party at Kristina Grier’s house.133 Grier was
charged with second-degree murder while armed with a deadly
weapon.134 Counsel for the defendant initially requested instructions on
the lesser-included offenses of first- and second-degree manslaughter,

127. Id. at 217, 211 P.3d at 445–46 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689
(1984)).
128. Id. at 221, 211 P.3d at 447.
129. Id. at 221 n.6, 211 P.3d at 447 n.6.
130. Id.
131. 150 Wash. App. 619, 208 P.3d 1221 (2009).
132. Id. at 640–46, 208 P.3d at 1232–35.
133. Id. at 623–29, 208 P.3d at 1224–27.
134. Id. at 629, 208 P.3d at 1227.
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but later withdrew that request without explanation.135 The trial court, in
addition to providing the instruction for second-degree murder, provided
the requested instructions on self-defense and the defense of others.136
After a three-week trial, the jury convicted Grier of second-degree
murder137 and sentenced her to 220 months in prison.138 However, on the
special verdict form, the jury found that Grier had not been armed with a
firearm at the time of the murder.139 Grier appealed her conviction140 and
claimed that her attorney never explained the option of offering jury
instructions on lesser-included offenses.141
Division II reversed the second-degree murder conviction on the basis
of ineffective assistance of counsel.142 Highlighting the strange facts of
the case143 and relying on Ward and Pittman,144 the court found that
Grier had been denied effective assistance of counsel because the choice
to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy in this case was unreasonable.145 In
line with those cases, Division II employed the “punishment-based”
standard and calculated the difference in possible punishments between
the crime of which Grier was convicted and the potential lesser-included
offenses.146 The court calculated the difference at 193 months, which it
noted was even greater than the discrepancy that existed in both Ward
and Pittman.147
Division II’s decision muddled Washington State’s approach to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on all-or-nothing
strategies. In January 2010, the Washington State Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider Grier.148

135. Id. at 630, 208 P.3d at 1228.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 631, 208 P.3d at 1228.
138. Id. at 631–32, 208 P.3d at 1228.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 632, 208 P.3d at 1228.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 645–46, 208 P.3d at 1235.
143. Id. at 638–39, 208 P.3d at 1231–32 (noting that the victim had likely stolen the guns earlier
that evening, it was unclear whether Grier had possessed any weapon at the time of the killing, no
one had seen the fatal shot, the murder weapon was never recovered, and Grier may have
reasonably believed she was acting in defense of herself or her son).
144. Id. at 640–41, 208 P.3d at 1233.
145. Id. at 644, 208 P.3d at 1234.
146. Id. at 641–42, 208 P.3d at 1233.
147. Id. at 642, 208 P.3d at 1233.
148. 167 Wash. 2d 1017, 224 P.3d 773 (2010).
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WASHINGTON SHOULD REVERSE STATE V. GRIER,
STRENGTHEN ITS RELIANCE ON STRICKLAND, AND
REAFFIRM HOFFMAN

Grier and Hassan have left Washington courts without a clear
standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on
all-or-nothing strategies. In Hassan, Division I retreated from its
“punishment-based” standard and reaffirmed its reliance on Strickland.
In contrast, Division II adopted the “punishment-based” standard in
Grier, thereby abandoning Washington’s traditional deference to defense
counsel on matters of trial and strategy. When the Washington State
Supreme Court decides State v. Grier, it should reverse Division II’s
judgment because the “punishment-based” standard conflicts with
Washington precedent, ignores federal guidance, and fails to accord
defense attorneys the deference necessary to enable a true adversarial
process. The Washington State Supreme Court should reaffirm State v.
Hoffman’s highly deferential standard to accord with Strickland and
align with the stance federal circuit courts have taken when addressing
all-or-nothing trial strategies.
A.

The “Punishment-Based” Standard Conflicts with Washington
Precedent and Runs Counter to Federal Court Decisions

The “punishment-based” standard conflicts with Washington State
Supreme Court precedent established in State v. Hoffman and runs
counter to the United States Supreme Court’s highly deferential
approach, which the Washington State Supreme Court has adopted as its
own.149 Additionally, the “punishment-based” standard disregards the
persuasive analysis provided by the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits regarding the reasonableness of all-or-nothing tactics in terms of
ineffective assistance of counsel complaints.150
In Hoffman, the state supreme court emphasized the need for a highly
deferential standard so that defendants complaining of all-or-nothing
tactics would not receive a second trial simply because their original
strategy failed.151 Ward, Pittman, and Grier cannot be reconciled with
Hoffman because they fail to apply Hoffman’s highly deferential
standard and fail to presume that counsel is effective. Because the
defendant in Hoffman chose to challenge the court’s failure to provide
149. See supra notes 65–67.
150. See supra notes 58–61.
151. State v. Hoffman, 116 Wash. 2d 51, 112, 804 P.2d 577, 609 (1991).
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lesser-included jury instructions sua sponte rather than challenging the
effectiveness of his attorney in selecting the all-or-nothing strategy,152
the Washington State Supreme Court did not rely on Strickland in
resolving the case. However, the Court did give great deference to trial
strategies employed by an attorney, as evidenced by the reluctance of the
Court to allow the defendant a second trial.153 Hoffman acknowledged
that all-or-nothing strategies involve a gamble, but also recognized the
potential benefits of such strategies.154 Even though Hoffman provides
the Washington State Supreme Court’s only relevant guidance as to the
reasonability of all-or-nothing tactics, Ward, Pittman, and Grier fail to
cite it.155
Additionally, when it decided Grier, the Court of Appeals,
Division II, completely overlooked its own precedent. Twenty years
earlier, Division II had found all-or-nothing strategies to be legitimate
trial tactics that “well could have resulted in outright acquittal.”156 The
court reached its conclusion without considering the difference in
possible punishments between the crime charged and the lesser-included
offense.157 Instead, it reasoned that a lesser-included-offense instruction
would have almost ensured a conviction of at least a misdemeanor, while
the all-or-nothing strategy might have resulted in an acquittal.158
The “punishment-based” standard also runs counter to Strickland,
which established a highly deferential standard of review for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.159 The Washington State Supreme Court
specifically adopted that approach.160 When state courts apply a
“punishment-based” standard, they ignore Strickland’s highly deferential
preference and disregard overwhelmingly consistent circuit court
analysis.
Under Washington State precedent, when addressing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, courts must utilize Strickland to determine
whether a defendant has shown that the defense attorney’s performance

152. Id. at 111–12, 804 P.2d at 609.
153. Id. at 112, 804 P.2d at 609.
154. Id.
155. See State v. Ward, 125 Wash. App. 243, 104 P.3d 670 (2004); State v. Pittman, 134 Wash.
App. 376, 166 P.3d 720 (2006); State v. Grier, 150 Wash. App. 619, 208 P.3d 1221 (2009).
156. State v. King, 24 Wash. App. 495, 501, 601 P.2d 982, 986 (1979).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984); see supra Part I.
160. See supra notes 65–67.
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fell below an objective level of reasonableness.161 Ward, Pittman, and
Grier ignore Strickland’s presumption of effective counsel and instead
scrutinize sentencing ranges for the applicable crimes in an effort to
determine whether a choice to pursue an all-or-nothing tactic would be
manifestly unreasonable.162 Such scrutiny does not accord with
Strickland because it allows hindsight to distort the court’s view of
counsel’s tactics.
In support of the “punishment-based” standard, Ward, Pittman and
Grier rely heavily on the United States Supreme Court case of Keeble v.
United States, a case Beck similarly relied upon when considering all-ornothing strategies in the capital context. Keeble addressed the Major
Crimes Act of 1885 and held that where a defendant requests a lesserincluded instruction, the court errs in refusing to provide such an
instruction.163 Even though Keeble is distinguishable from cases where
the defense attorney has chosen to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy,164
Washington courts have said Keeble supports their conclusion that a
defendant is entitled to lesser-included-offense instructions.165 Beck is
similarly inapplicable because it applies only to capital cases166 and
federal courts have consistently declined to extend its reasoning to
noncapital cases.167 Because the entire line of state cases culminating in
Grier and Hassan addresses the reasonableness of strategically choosing
to forgo lesser-included-offense instructions as opposed to the
defendant’s right to receive them, these cases fall outside the scope of
both Keeble and Beck. Recognizing it had incorrectly relied on dicta in
Keeble, Division I questioned its reliance on the “punishment-based”
standard with Hassan and acknowledged its prior error.168
Even if the reasoning in Beck and Keeble were applicable to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on a failure to request
lesser-included-offense instructions in noncapital cases, that reasoning
would not apply to Grier because the facts there are distinguishable. In
161. See supra notes 65–67.
162. See State v. Ward, 125 Wash. App. 243, 249, 104 P.3d 670, 672–73 (2004); State v. Pittman,
134 Wash. App. 376, 388–89, 166 P.3d 720, 725–26 (2006); State v. Grier, 150 Wash. App. 619,
642, 208 P.3d 1221, 1233 (2009).
163. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1973); see supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
164. See supra Part III.B; State v. Hassan, 151 Wash. App. 209, 221 n.6, 211 P.3d 441, 447 n.6
(2009).
165. See supra Part III.A.
166. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980); see also supra Part I.B.
167. See Hall, supra note 56 and accompanying text.
168. Hassan, 151 Wash. App. at 221 n.6, 211 P.3d at 447 n.6.
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Beck and Keeble, the defendants were clearly guilty of some offense; the
only dispute was whether it was the offense charged or the lesserincluded offense.169 Grier, however, was not clearly guilty of any
offense.170 The disparity of the verdict forms—where the jury found
Grier guilty of second-degree murder but did not find that she was in
possession of a deadly weapon at the time of the murder—demonstrates
the lack of clarity at the trial.171 Because Grier is distinguishable, the
Washington State Supreme Court should not rely on the reasoning
employed in Beck or Keeble when reviewing Grier’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
Finally, the “punishment-based” standard adopted in Grier also runs
counter to the majority of federal circuit court decisions.172 Federal
circuit courts that have addressed all-or-nothing strategies in the context
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims have extended Strickland’s
highly deferential standard of review to those claims.173 While this
practice is not binding on Washington courts, it should be highly
persuasive given that Washington has adopted Strickland as its own
standard.174
B.

Reversing Grier Would Provide Better Guidance for Attorneys,
Allow for a True Adversarial Process, and Encourage Attorneys to
Be Zealous Advocates for Their Clients

While the all-or-nothing strategy has been criticized as being
“problematic,”175 providing parties an opportunity to make their own
strategic decisions and to utilize the inherent uncertainty of the judicial
process is necessary in our adversarial system.176 The repercussions of
applying ex post facto scrutiny to trial tactics far outweigh the benefits
because preventing attorneys from utilizing legitimate trial strategies
will ultimately make attorneys less effective.177

169. See Beck, 447 U.S. at 634; Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1973).
170. State v. Grier, 150 Wash. App. 619, 208 P.3d 1221 (2009).
171. Id. at 645–46, 208 P.3d at 1235.
172. See supra notes 58–61.
173. See supra notes 58–61.
174. See supra note 66.
175. See Pflaum, supra note 14, at 291.
176. See id. at 304.
177. Judge, supra note 12, at 209 (noting that “scrutiny of defense counsel’s choice of trial
tactics . . . may, in actuality, decrease defense counsel’s effectiveness”).
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Courts need to maintain a highly deferential level of review for
ineffective counsel claims because doing so allows attorneys to serve as
zealous advocates for their clients. A specific set of rules determining
the effectiveness of counsel would “interfere with the constitutionally
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel
must have in making tactical decisions.”178 If a defense attorney knows
that the appeals court will be highly deferential to the attorney’s trial
decisions, that attorney can more easily make legitimate strategic
decisions. Conversely, if a presumption of effectiveness is not in place,
then an attorney’s “performance and even willingness to serve could be
adversely affected.”179 Such restrictions on defense counsels’ actions
could “decrease defense counsel’s potential effectiveness” by interfering
with their preparation and conduct.180 Furthermore, the fear of being
deemed ineffective could “dampen the ardor and impair the
independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned
cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.”181 With a
highly deferential standard of review in place, defense attorneys may
have more confidence in their chosen trial strategies, and prosecuting
attorneys need not fear that a conviction will be overturned should the
defense attorney choose to withhold lesser-included-offense instructions.
Additionally, overturning convictions based on close scrutiny of trial
tactics would likely result in more appeals stemming from ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.182 The proliferation of such claims would
likely flood courts because anyone dissatisfied with a trial outcome
could appeal a verdict in the hope of securing a chance to re-try the case
with another strategy.183 Such an approach would discredit the judicial
process because the presumption of jury verdict finality would be
severely weakened.
Critics of all-or-nothing strategies argue that all possible instructions
should be submitted to the jury because lawyers cannot predict how a
178. See Judge, supra note 12, at 224 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690
(1984)).
179. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
180. See Judge, supra note 12, at 224.
181. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
182. Id. (“The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed
guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.”).
183. Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 78 (1991) (“[A]dherence to strict rules defining effective assistance could
infringe on tactical decisions by defense counsel and discourage representation of criminal
defendants. Such stringent standards could potentially lead to a flood of appellate challenges based
on ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
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jury will think.184 While jurors ostensibly must acquit if the prosecution
did not prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt,185 they
might not comply with that standard if given a choice between only the
most severe sentence and acquittal.186 Critics argue that given such a
limited choice, jurors might err on the side of conviction merely so the
defendant does not walk free.187 However, jurors’ unpredictability cuts
both ways. If lesser-included-offense instructions are provided where a
defendant presents a theory of self-defense, the jury might “evade its
responsibility to conduct rigorous fact-finding on all elements of the
charged offense and, instead, compromise the verdict by convicting of
the lesser offense” because of the uncertainties raised by the defense.188
Courts and counsel cannot determine how a jury will rule in any given
case,189 and fear of how a jury might react should not determine the level
of review applied to an appeal.
The “punishment-based” standard adopted in Grier does not resolve
the primary concerns critics raise regarding all-or-nothing strategies.
Instead, it creates new quandaries. For example, how should courts
decide how much of a discrepancy in punishments is required before a
decision to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy becomes unreasonable? Is
the difference in punishment affected by the relation of that difference to
the standard sentencing ranges? In State v. Pittman,190 for example,
would the court have found that the difference of six to seven months
was manifestly unreasonable if the two punishments had been eighteen
versus twenty-five months? Or was the fact that the lesser offense
carried only a ninety-day sentence the reason why a disparity of six
months was deemed manifestly unreasonable? In creating the
“punishment-based” standard, the state courts of appeals failed to clarify
their reasoning and have consequently promulgated a nebulous rule that
produces inconsistent and disordered results.
184. See Pflaum, supra note 14, at 327–28.
185. Laura Ann Cooper, Comment, Should Juries Be Able to Agree to Disagree? People v.
Boettcher and the ‘Unanimous Acquittal First’ Instruction, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1027, 1043 (1988).
For other criticisms of the all-or-nothing strategy, see supra notes 12, 14, 56; and Tracy L. Hamrick,
Looking at Lesser Included Offenses on an “All or Nothing” Basis: State v. Bullard and the
Supporting Sporting Approach to Criminal Justice, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1470, 1470 (1991).
186. See Pflaum, supra note 14, at 327–28, 291.
187. See id. at 291.
188. See id. at 327–29; Michael H. Hoffheimer, Lesser Included Offenses in Mississippi, 74 MISS.
L.J. 135, 146 (2004).
189. J. Mark Cooney, Benching the Monday-Morning Quarterback: The “Attorney Judgment”
Defense to Legal-Malpractice Claims, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2006).
190. State v. Pittman, 134 Wash. App. 376, 388–89, 166 P.3d 720, 725–26 (2006).
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Consequently, the Washington State Supreme Court should reverse
State v. Grier, affirm Grier’s conviction, and establish a clear approach
for considering effective representation in the context of all-or-nothing
trial strategies. Such an approach would realign Washington State with
its own precedent and the precedent of the United States Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The conflicting decisions in Grier and Hassan demonstrate the strong
need for the Washington State Supreme Court to establish a clear policy
for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on all-ornothing strategies. While the courts of appeals might have been making
a good-faith effort to define reasonableness in cases of all-or-nothing
trial strategies, their efforts have actually created confusion and
tightened Washington’s standard of review beyond what Washington
precedent allows. While courts struggle with this confusing state of
affairs, they also risk receiving a significant increase in appeals based on
all-or-nothing strategies.191
While there may be room for a more balanced approach to
determining whether a defendant received effective assistance of
counsel, analyzing all-or-nothing strategies based on differences in
punishments is not the answer. In determining a standard, the
Washington State Supreme Court should embrace Strickland and create
precedent where appeals courts grant great deference when dealing with
complaints about trial strategies. A defendant should not be able to

191. As of June 2010, eighteen appeals in Washington based on ineffective assistance of counsel
claims for all-or-nothing trial tactics have relied on Ward. See State v. Baker, 2010 WL 1756728
(Wash. Ct. App. May 3, 2010); State v. Breitung, 2010 WL 1553572 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 20,
2010); In re Crace, 154 Wash. App. 1016, 2010 WL 179151 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2010); State
v. White, 152 Wash. App. 1046, 2009 WL 3360194 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009); State v. Grier,
150 Wash. App. 619, 208 P.3d 1221 (2009); State v. Hassan, 151 Wash. App. 209, 211 P.3d 441
(2009); O’Connell v. Uttech, 2009 WL 927493 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2009); State v. Holloway,
148 Wash. App. 1005, 2009 WL 58919 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2009); State v. Warren, 144 Wash.
App. 1050, 2008 WL 2261451 (Wash. Ct. App. Jun. 3, 2008); State v. Chau, 142 Wash. App. 1036,
2008 WL 176374 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2008); State v. O’Connell, 137 Wash. App. 81, 152 P.3d
349 (2007); State v. Miller, 128 Wash. App. 1057, 2007 WL 1575223 (Wash. Ct. App. May 31,
2007); In re Relfe, 138 Wash. App. 1032, 2007 WL 1314547 (Wash. Ct. App. May 7, 2007); State
v. Bostwick, 137 Wash. App. 1027, 2007 WL 615144 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2007); State v.
Raber, 134 Wash. App. 1027, 2006 WL 2246195 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2006); State v. Stevens,
134 Wash. App. 1014, 2006 WL 2130370 (Wash. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2006); State v. Hassan, 133
Wash. App. 1010, 2006 WL 1462741 (Wash. Ct. App. May 30, 2006); State v. Hayes, 131 Wash.
App. 1056, 2006 WL 533398 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2006). Prior to the decision in Ward, there
were only two such appeals. See supra note 77.
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pursue one strategy at trial and then, if it fails, appeal for the chance to
pursue an alternative strategy.

